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PREVIEW; High Country Paving, Inc. v. United Fire & Casualty, 
Co.: Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine  
Deanna Rothwell 
The Ninth Circuit was originally set to hear oral argument on this 
matter on Tuesday, March 31, 2020.  On March 11, 2020, the Court 
deemed the matter suitable for decision without oral argument.  
Nonetheless, given the importance of the issues presented by this 
extraordinary writ, the Montana Law Review presents the following 
preview for High Country Paving, Inc. v. United Fire & Casualty Co.      
I. INTRODUCTION 
This case presents the issue of when the attorney-client privilege 
and work product protections can be waived. An employee of High 
Country Paving, Inc. (“High Country”) was involved in an automobile 
accident that resulted in the death of one and the serious injury of 
another. High Country’s liability insurer, United Fire & Casualty Co. 
(“United Fire”), settled with the third-party victims for policy limits 
without obtaining a release for High Country. As a result, High Country 
sued United Fire for unfair claim settlement practices and breach of 
contract. 
During discovery, both parties moved to compel the production of 
privileged information which the district court granted. On November 
11, 2019, High Country filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus before the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the 
mental impressions of its attorneys are not directly at issue in this case, 
and, therefore, there was no waiver of privileges. Additionally, High 
Country argues that United Fire failed to establish the requirements 
necessary to discover work product. United Fire contends that High 
Country placed its attorneys’ mental impressions directly at issue and 
that, therefore, discovery of attorney communications and work product 
is warranted.  
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In August 2016,1 a High Country employee was involved in an 
automobile accident that killed one person and injured another.2 
Following the accident, the injured parties filed a third-party claim that 
 
1 Plaintiff’s Preliminary Pretrial Statement at 3, High Country Paving, Inc. v. United Fire & 
Casualty Co. (D. Mont. Mar. 27, 2019) (No. 18-cv-00163-DWM). 
2 Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 3, High Country Paving, Inc. v. United Fire & Casualty Co. (9th 
Cir. Nov. 12, 2019) (No. 19-72853). 
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triggered High Country’s liability coverage.3 United Fire was High 
Country’s liability insurer at the time of the accident.4 United Fire settled 
with the third-party claimants for policy limits.5 Notably, United Fire, 
over High Country’s objection, failed to obtain a release for High 
Country as part of the settlement. 6 High Country then separately 
negotiated a settlement with the third-party claimants, “paying an 
additional $1.275 million and assigning certain legal claims in exchange 
for a release.”7 High Country then sued United Fire in federal court 
alleging state law claims for unfair claim settlement practices8 and 
breach of contract.9 United Fire argued that it acted reasonably in 
“paying the policy limits without obtaining a release” and “in relying on 
the advice of counsel in making coverage decisions.”10 
Both United Fire and High Country filed motions to compel 
disclosure of attorney-client privileged communications and documents 
protected by the work-product doctrine.11 United Fire sought to discover 
“any communications containing any evaluation” of the third-party 
claims12 to “corroborate United Fire’s conclusion.”13 Both motions were 
granted.14 The district court found that there was a waiver of both 
privileges by High Country for two reasons.15 First, although High 
Country had not designated its attorneys as expert witnesses, it did place 
its attorney’s letters and valuations of the underlying case directly at 
issue.16 The district court found that this amounted to a waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege by High Country.17 Second, the district court 
determined that although the evaluations were indisputably prepared “in 
anticipation of litigation,” High Country put the assessments at issue by 
 
3 Id.  
4 Id.  
5 Id. at 4.  
6 Id 
7 Id.  
8 First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 22-25, High Country Paving, Inc. v. 
United Fire & Casualty Co. (D. Mont. Mar. 29, 2019) (No. 18-cv-00163-DWM).  
9 Id. at 25-30.  
10 Answer to Amended Complaint at 20-22, High Country Paving, Inc. v. United Fire & Casualty 
Co. (D. Mont. April 18, 2019) (No. 18-cv-00163-DWM). 
11 See Plaintiff’s Combined Brief Re: Motions to Compel, High Country Paving, Inc. v. United Fire 
& Casualty Co. (D. Mont. Aug. 2, 2019) (No. 18-cv-00163-DWM); See also Defendant’s Motion to 
Compel Based on Waiver of Work Product and Attorney-Client Privilege, High Country Paving, 
Inc. v. United Fire & Casualty Co. (D. Mont. July 15, 2019) (No. 18-cv-00163-DWM). 
12 Defendant’s Motion to Compel, supra note 11, at 1.  
13 Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion to Compel Based on Waiver of Work Product and 
Attorney-Client Privilege at 7, High Country Paving, Inc. v. United Fire & Casualty Co. (D. Mont. 
July 15, 2019) (No. 18-cv-00163-DWM). 
14 Opinion and Order at 14, High Country Paving, Inc. v. United Fire & Casualty Co. (D. Mont. 
Nov. 4, 2019) (No. 18-cv-00163-DWM). 
15 Id. at 10–12.  
16 Id. at 11.  
17 Id.  
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“challenging the reasonableness of United Fire’s settlement decision.”18 
Because there was no other source for information regarding High 
Country’s assessment of its legal liability, any work product protection 
was waived.19 High Country then filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus 
with the Ninth Circuit asking the Court to vacate the district court’s 
order.20 
III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
A. Background 
As a threshold matter, in federal diversity cases, privilege issues are 
controlled by the forum state’s substantive law, while work product 
issues are governed by federal law.21 Accordingly, in this case, Montana 
law governs the attorney-client privilege issue while federal law applies 
to the work product doctrine dispute.  
Both parties utilize Dion v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance 
Company22 and Palmer by Diacon v. Farmers Insurance Exchange23 as 
the main authorities in this case. Dion involved a motion to compel both 
attorney-client communications and work product from an insurance 
company that refused to pay some of the plaintiff’s claims for benefits.24 
The Court held that the work product at issue was discoverable under 
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that the insurance 
company had waived the opinion work product protection.25 First, the 
Court found that because the plaintiff’s claims required her to establish 
that the insurer lacked reasonable justification for refusing the payments, 
the mental impressions and opinions of the insurer, and therefore its 
attorneys, were directly at issue and the plaintiff’s need for that 
information was overwhelming based on the fact that claim processing 
“is almost entirely an internal operation and [the insurer’s] claims file 
reflects a unique, contemporaneous record of the handling of the 
claim.”26 Second, the Court found that in naming its attorney as an expert 
witness, the insurance company waived its opinion work product 
 
18 Id. at 11–12.  
19 Id. at 12.  
20 See Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 2.  
21 Opinion and Order, supra note 14, at 2; Fed. R. Civ. P. 501.  
22 185 F.R.D. 288 (D. Mont. 1998).  
23 861 P.2d 895 (Mont. 1993).  
24 Id. at 290–92.  
25 Id. at 292–94.  
26 Id. at 292–93. 
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protection because without discovery of those files, the plaintiff’s ability 
to effectively cross examine witnesses would be impaired.27  
In Palmer, the plaintiff sued an insurance company for bad faith.28 
The district court had allowed evidence from an underlying trial, 
including privileged information, to be admitted.29 The plaintiff claimed 
that the insurance company waived its privilege by stating it would retain 
new counsel in order to potentially call its original counsel as 
witnesses.30 The Court determined that this statement did not amount to a 
waiver because it had not been sent until a year after the district court 
ordered the production of the insurer’s privilege documents and that 
“even then, [the insurer] stated that the attorney’s would testify to factual 
matters, but would not testify regarding confidential privileged 
information.”31 The Court further denied the insured’s claims that the 
insurer waived attorney-client privilege and stated that reliance on an 
attorney’s advice is not the crucial factor in determining waiver.32  
The Palmer Court also detailed the difference between ordinary 
work product and opinion work product.33 To discover materials 
considered ordinary work product, a party must establish that the 
materials are relevant, the party must demonstrate a substantial need for 
the materials, and the party cannot obtain the substantial equivalent of 
the materials through other means, without undue hardship.34 The Court 
applied this test and held that in a bad faith case, the insurer’s mental 
impressions and opinions are directly at issue to determine whether an 
insurer’s denial is reasonable.35 However, the Court also made clear that 
without an advice of counsel defense, the attorney’s mental impressions 
and opinions are not at issue and relevant opinion work product is not 
discoverable.36 
B. High Country’s Argument 
High Country presents three main arguments: (1) it did not bring 
any claim or defense that put the attorney’s mental impressions directly 
at issue; (2) it did not name its attorney’s as expert witnesses; and (3) 
 
27 Id. at 293. 
28 Palmer, 861 P.2d at 899.  
29 Id. at 899–900.  
30 Id. at 900.  
31 Id. at 906. 
32 Id. at 907.  
33 Id. at 910.  
34 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(i)-(ii). 
35 Palmer, 861 P.2d at 911. 
36 Id. at 911–12.  
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United Fire cannot show the requisite “overwhelming” need in order to 
be granted discovery of protected work product.  
High Country presents two reasons in support of its argument that it 
has not waived attorney-client privilege. The first reason is that High 
Country did not put the attorney’s mental impressions directly at issue 
because the letters sent to United Fire are not waivers37 and the issue in 
this case does not call into question the mental impressions of High 
Country’s attorneys.38 High Country contends that sending the letters to 
United Fire did not amount to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege 
because both letters only stated the public legal position of High 
Country39 and do not contain the valuations or assessments of its 
attorneys.40 High Country argues that the letters are not an affirmative 
use of privileged information.41 High Country also argues that the issue 
in this case is whether United Fire breached its duties to High Country by 
unfairly prioritizing its own interests, and therefore, the issue does not 
put High Country’s attorneys’ mental impressions directly at issue.42  
The second reason High Country argues it has not waived attorney-
client privilege is that High Country named its attorneys as fact, not 
expert, witnesses.43 Thus, their potential testimony does not amount to a 
waiver.44 High Country contends that asking the court for a ruling based 
on what the attorneys might say acts would amount to an improper 
advisory opinion and is inappropriate.45 High Country agrees with United 
Fire that if its attorneys were to testify about work product or privileged 
communications, then it would be a waiver on the part of High 
Country.46 High Country also agrees with United Fire’s assertion that 
testimony from High Country’s attorneys is not necessary and that it has 
no intention of calling either attorney unless it is deemed necessary to 
rebut other witnesses.47 These two circumstances, according to High 
Country, makes the district court’s advisory decision improper and 
inappropriate.  
High Country asserts that its work product remains protected for the 
same two reasons detailed above as well as because United Fire has not 
 
37 Plaintiff’s Combined Brief, supra note 11, at 10.  
38 Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 2, at 21.  
39 Plaintiff’s Combined Brief, supra note 11, at 11. 
40 Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 2, at 20.  
41 Plaintiff’s Combined Brief, supra note 11, at 11–12. 
42 Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 2, at 6. 
43  Plaintiff’s Combined Brief, supra note 11, at 12–13. 
44 Id.  
45 Id. at 13.  
46 Id. at 13–14.  
47 Id. at 14.  
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shown the “overwhelming” need required, absent a waiver, to access 
High Country’s opinion work product.48 The “conclusions, analysis, 
advice and legal theories” of a party’s attorneys are considered opinion 
work product which is highly protected.49 High Country contends that the 
arguments United Fire puts forth to obtain access to High Country’s 
opinion work product does not meet the exacting standard required to 
overcome opinion work product protection.50  
C. United Fire’s Argument 
 United Fire has two main arguments: (1) High Country has waived 
both its attorney-client privilege and its opinion work product protection 
regarding the evaluations of liability produced by its attorneys; and (2) it 
can show the relevance, need, and hardship required to overcome the 
work-product privilege High Country has asserted in relation to the 
evaluations of its potential liability 
With respect to the first argument, United Fire contends that High 
Country has waived the attorney-client privilege by entering into 
evidence the letters sent by High Country’s attorney because those letters 
contain the opinions of its attorneys and therefore puts the attorneys’ 
mental impressions directly at issue.51 United Fire argues that, based on 
the analysis done by the Court in Dion,52 the attorney-client privilege 
was waived because High Country is intending to utilize its attorneys as 
witnesses and has made the confidential communications a material 
issue.53 United Fire asserts that the designation of High Country’s 
attorneys as fact witnesses does not distinguish this case from Dion.54 
Further, United Fire asserts that the use of the letters sent by its attorneys 
to United Fire as evidence have the same effect as its counsel testifying 
to his opinions.55 Thus, introduction of those letters waives the 
privilege.56  
Overall, United Fire argues that not allowing it to have access to the 
attorney-client communications “prejudices [its] defense of this 
action.”57 United Fire also contends that High Country’s attorneys have 
no purely factual information that could not be offered by another and 
 
48 Id. at 14–15.  
49 Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 2, at 16.  
50 Plaintiff’s Combined Brief, supra note 11, at 15.  
51 Id. at 16. 
52 Dion, 185 F.R.D. at 294–95.  
53 Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion to Compel, supra note 13, at 16–17. 
54 Id. at 18. 
55 Id.  
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 19–20. 
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therefore, any testimony they would give would implicate his thoughts, 
making discovery necessary.58    
With respect to the second argument, United Fire argues that there 
are multiple ways in which High County’s evaluations are relevant. One, 
United Fire argues that, based on the interrogatories, High Country is 
taking the position that $3 million was not a reasonable settlement value 
of the claims which makes the attorney’s valuations relevant to the 
credibility of that position.59 Two, United Fire argues that High 
Country’s attorney’s evaluations are relevant because the fact that High 
Country was willing to pay an additional $1.275 million insinuates that 
the internal evaluations will corroborate United Fire’s evaluation that the 
claim’s settlement value exceeded $3 million.60 Third, United Fire also 
contends that High Country’s argument that United Fire took away High 
Country’s ability to escape paying its own money to the claimants makes 
all internal assessments relevant.61 
United Fire contends that it has shown the need required for the 
discovery of work product through the following arguments. First, 
United Fire claims it is critical to know the settlement value of the claims 
for multiple reasons. It claims that the settlement value is critical  
because if High Country’s evaluations support United Fire’s evaluation, 
then the Montana Supreme Court will affirm United Fire’s decision to 
pay the policy limit without a release.62 It also asserts that High 
Country’s evaluations assess the credibility of High Country’s statement 
that its liability could be less than $3 million.63 Finally, United Fire 
maintains High Country’s claims evaluations will demonstrate whether 
High Country actually believed that United Fire took away the ability of 
High Country to escape paying its own money.64  
United Fire argues that it also meets the third element required to 
waive work product protection because it has no other way to obtain that 




58 Id. at 20. 
59 Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion to Compel, supra note 13, at 2. 
60 Id. at 2–3. 
61 Id. at 3.  
62 Id. at 13.  
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 13.  
65 Id. at 15.  




The critical questions before the court are as follows: (1) whether 
High Country placed its attorney’s letters and valuations directly at issue; 
and (2) whether United Fire has shown the requisite relevance, need, and 
hardship for the discovery of ordinary work product plus the additional 
overwhelming or compelling need for discovery of opinion work 
product. In both Palmer and Dion, the Court dealt with motions to 
compel directed at insurance companies. This appeal, on the other hand, 
is dealing with a motion to compel directed at the insured. This 
distinction alters the analysis because the Court must determine how the 
standards put in place in Palmer and Dion apply to the insured. 
Nevertheless, some cases have dealt with motions to compel against the 
insured and discovery of privileged or protected documents. 
 One such case is MapleWood Partners, L.P. v. Indian Harbor Ins. 
Co.,66 which held that by bringing a breach of contract suit that alleged 
unfair allocation of coverage, the plaintiff placed its attorney’s 
assessments whether the allocation was fair directly at issue, thereby 
waiving any attorney-client privilege.67 High Country distinguishes 
Maplewood Partners and argues that the issue is this case is not about 
the fairness of the settlement but is instead about whether United Fire 
breached its duties to High Country by unfairly prioritizing its own 
interests.68  
In determining the answer to this first question, the Ninth Circuit 
will have to decide whether the issue is centrally about the fairness of the 
settlement or about what Montana law requires of insurance companies. 
If the Ninth Circuit determines that the case is about the first question, 
then it is likely that, following its prior holding in Palmer, the Court will 
likely affirm and find that the mental impressions of High Country’s 
attorneys are actual issues in the case, making discovery necessary. 
However, if the Court determines that the question here is more centrally 
about whether Montana law requires insurance companies to pay out 
reasonably clear damages without a release, it is possible the Ninth 
Circuit would find that the mental impressions of the attorneys are not at 
issue, except for those of counsel for United Fire who did assert an 
advice of counsel defense. Further, the Ninth Circuit will need to 
consider whether the letters High Country has offered into evidence 
simply state the public legal opinion of High Country, or if they contain 
 
66 2011 WL 3918597 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 2011). 
67 Id. at 8. 
68 Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 2, at 6. 
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attorney valuations that therefore waive privilege.69 The Ninth Circuit 
must also determine whether High Country’s actions in calling its 
attorneys as fact witnesses distinguishes this case from Dion.70 This 
Court’s holding in Palmer stated that calling an attorney as a fact witness 
is a distinction,71 however, High Country has admitted letters that, 
depending on the Court’s ruling on the above question, may negate this 
distinction. 
In determining the answer to the second question, the Ninth Circuit 
will need to again consider whether the mental impressions of High 
Country’s attorneys are directly at issue in this case in order to determine 
the relevance and need requirements for discovery of work product. If 
the Court determines that the mental impressions are not at issue, it is 
likely that work product would not be discoverable because the three 
requirements set forth in Rule 26(b)(3)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure would not be met. However, if the Court does determine that 
the mental impressions are directly at issue, then both the attorney-client 
privilege, which also grants greater protection to opinion work product, 
and the ordinary work product protection, would likely be held to have 
been waived and therefore discoverable. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Court must further define what “directly at issue” means in the 
context of privilege and whether the mental impressions of the insured’s 
attorneys are at issue in cases where the insured is disputing the decision 
of the insurer. If the Court determines that in disputing the actions of an 
insurer, an insured is putting the mental impressions of its attorneys 
directly at issue, this can have far reaching impacts on privilege 
generally, potentially decreasing the protection that the attorney-client 
privilege and work product doctrine provide. However, the ruling may 
also be narrowly construed, similar to the rulings that have held that 
utilizing an advice of counsel defense is always a waiver. If that is the 
case, then this ruling has the potential to clarify the boundaries of the 
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine.  
 
69 Plaintiff’s Combined Brief, supra note 11, at 11–12.  
70 Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion to Compel, supra note 13, at 18; Plaintiff’s Combined 
Brief, supra note 11, at 9–10. 
71 Palmer, 861 P.2d at 906.  
